When God Hates: How Liberal Guilt Lets the New Right Get Away With Murder by Gabilondo, Jose M.
Florida International University College of Law 
eCollections 
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2009 
When God Hates: How Liberal Guilt Lets the New Right Get Away 
With Murder 
Jose M. Gabilondo 
College of Law, Florida International University, jose.gabilondo@fiu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Society 
Commons, Other Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jose M. Gabilondo, When God Hates: How Liberal Guilt Lets the New Right Get Away With Murder Wake 
Forest L. Rev. (2009). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications/83 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at eCollections. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCollections. For more information, 
please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
? ???? ?????
Citation: 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 617 2009 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Fri Nov 14 18:55:31 2014
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0043-003X
WHEN GOD HATES: HOW LIBERAL GUILT LETS THE
NEW RIGHT GET AWAY WITH MURDER
Josg Gabilondo*
INTRODUCTION
During the past three decades, a hardworking coalition of
conservatives, religious fundamentalists, and reactionaries has
worked at rolling back some social changes that many would
consider the soul of liberal progress. Until recently, higher
education had tended to escape this campaign. During the past
decade, though, the coalition has set its sights on the university.
This could not come at a worse time, especially now that many
public universities face budget cuts marking the transition from
being publicly supported to "publicly assisted." Declining public
support for universities may not be a coincidence, either. It may
reflect how the coalition has pushed states to rethink their social
contract with universities, which have been painted by the coalition
as a source of unwelcome ideas and dangerous cultural trends.1
The coalition's grievance against the academy takes the form of
a classic antidiscrimination complaint: excessively liberal faculty at
universities-it is said-persecute conservatives in hiring and
promotion, and, in general, by thinking less of them. The
"conservative" in question often turns out to hold strongly religious
views that are subjected-so the lament goes-to hostility
comparable to racism, ethnic persecution, and homophobia and-an
important last move-are equally worthy of mitigation as these
forms of animus.2 In the conservative's tale, he has become a
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Associate Professor, College of
Law, Florida International University; Harvard College, B.A. 1987; Boalt Hall,
J.D. 1991. My thanks go to Shannon Gilreath for supporting the critical legal
study of straight supremacy. I first presented part of this argument at a
conference of Emory Law School's Legal Feminism Project about feminist
perspectives on religion. As always, Jorge Esquirol provided invaluable
feedback on this Essay. So did Richard Delgado, to whom I am also grateful.
1. CHRISTOPHER NEWFIELD, UNMAKING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY: THE FORTY
YEAR ASSAULT ON THE MEDDLE CLASS (2008), makes a complementary argument
to my own, although the author's focus is on class and race while my focus is on
sexual orientation.
2. As some religious conservatives have noted, "There is something
disquieting about characterizing fundamentalist Christians (and 'by extension,'
most sociocultural conservatives) as unsuited to the life of the mind, unwilling
or unable to think scientifically, and who remain in lower quality positions
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member of a suspect class in need of remedial protection, even if it
means affirmative action on behalf of views that some may find
repugnant. The claim does not persuade me, but the wailing is
working, as suggested by the University of Colorado's decision to
dedicate nine million dollars to endow a chair in "conservative
studies," the popularity of David Horowitz's Academic Bill of Rights,
and the brouhaha about the political orientation of faculty.
By speaking of discrimination, the claim bears a surface
resemblance to the antidiscrimination arguments brought by racial
and other minorities, but all is not as it seems. The history of those
minorities was different, as would be their future: the passage of
time revealed that the majorities who had oppressed these
minorities were grossly mistaken, therefore affirmative action
seemed justified. The conservative lament has a different history
(no history at all, in fact) and a different future. Or so you must
conclude if my argument persuades you. Really, the conservative
lament is an Orwellian strategy to sack liberal values by aping
liberal claims in a way that really turns back the clock on liberal
progress.
How did any of this pass the laugh test? Because liberals failed
to reckon with the full implications of the postmodern attack on
meaning. Stanley Fish made the point in a 1995 editorial in the
New York Times: "Liberals and progressives have been slow to
realize that their preferred vocabulary has been hijacked and that
when they respond to once hallowed phrases [and words like
'discrimination'] they are responding to a ghost now animated by a
new machine."3 Left unchecked, the hijackings have only worsened
in the past fifteen years. Like lambs to the slaughter, liberals have
appeased the new "nattering nabobs of negativism" (Spiro Agnew's
phrase for the liberals of his day) when they ought to have been
more vigilant in opposing the conservative takeover. For example,
the coalition bills itself as ambiguously "conservative," but this hides
just how radical some of its goals are. Trying to win back some
ground, I use the term "conservative" only in quotation marks to
signal that its scope is up for grabs. Instead, I call this coalition of
conservatives, religious fundamentalists and social reactionaries the
"New Right" in order to better reflect its location on the political
spectrum.
I start by arguing that the New Right "hijacked" the liberal
register as part of a recurring political-economy cycle in which a
because they're happier among their own kind." Thomas Bartlett, Paper Assails
Report on Liberal Bias, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Sept. 2,
2005,at A16 (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v52/iO2/02aO16O3.htm.
3. Stanley Fish, Editorial, How the Right Hijacked the Magic Words, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 13, 1995, at C15, as reprinted in STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH
PRINCIPLE 309, 312 (1999).
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secular trigger activates a reactionary backlash, the central goal of
which becomes to eradicate the offending social conditions that gave
rise to the trigger. The trigger that concerns me most is the
accelerating decline of heterosexual privilege, as reflected by the
growing opposition to official discrimination against sexual
minorities. The expressions of backlash that I consider here deal
with attempts to make "strong religion" politically correct by
increasing the stature of religion, religious studies, and devotional
practices in the university.
These pro-religion arguments often turn on three arguments
(or, to use the postmodern convention, "moves). First, society is
under siege by a godless Left that has driven good, God-fearing folk
out of academic life and into the modern equivalent of catacombs.
(This is a textbook example of projective denial, because in fact the
opposite is true: the New Right has rezoned our collective political
imagination rightward and God-ward.) Second, under the rubric of
ideological diversity, celebrating diversity should include religious
fundamentalists and social reactionaries, especially when their
ideologies stand out as different because they include religiously
based animus against sexual minorities. A third move attempts to
draw parallels between religious and secular society so as to make
the former seem like the equal of the latter, a rhetorical move much
in vogue after September 11, 2001. Together, these three claims
generate arguments that put liberals on the defensive because they
reach the liberal G-spot: guilt. To help get over this guilt, I suggest
some rhetorical countermoves for contending with these moves.
To support my claim that this pro-religion backlash includes a
counterreaction against sexual minorities, I argue that the
conceptual liquidation of these minorities forms the common
structural core of many fundamentalist religions. Religious
persecution of sexual minorities is nothing new, but what is
noteworthy is the growth of multisectarian alliances against gays,
lesbians, and other such minorities. Cutting across the sectarian
differences that have traditionally defined the borders of faith
communities, these alliances pose special risks for sexual minorities
because they persecute them in the name of God, one of liberalism's
"safe words" that excuses the actor from obeying core
antidiscrimination norms. As proof, I show how the monotheistic
Abrahamic sects, particularly their orthodox fringes, come together
against sexual minorities with a unity of religious purpose that is all
the more striking in light of the competition between the sects in an
increasingly linked world for a larger market share of souls.
By connecting the ideological maneuvering of the New Right,
strong religion, and straight supremacy, this Essay ties together
three projects of great current interest. First, as a study in ideology,
it shows how the "Ideology Snatchers" of the New Right co-opted the
20091
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liberal register by reframing it so as to neutralize its political
valence. Second, I point out the strength of the religious undertow
is in the current battle of ideas about the professional culture of
academe. Third, I show that at the heart of strong religion is a
constitutive investment in normative heterosexuality as a family
trait. It puts the sects on a crash course with the future. Small
wonder that gay-rights advances activate the "trigger-backlash
cycle" like no other social trigger (not even abortion rights, their
next closest kin).
I. THE RELIGIOUS WAR OF MANEUVER AGAINST THE UNIVERSITY
Strong religion tries to influence secular society as part of a
political-economy cycle in which a secular trigger activates a
religious backlash that, once mobilized, attempts to counter the
offending social conditions that created the trigger. In this case, the
trigger-backlash cycle plays out in terms of a culture war between
liberals and conservatives, so definitions of both ideologies are in
order. After showing what creates the impetus for backlash, I
identify some of the arguments used by the New Right to co-opt the
liberal register. These arguments further a desecularization agenda
that is mobilized in the trigger-backlash cycle.
A. Strong Religion as an Engine of the New Right
Let me start by defining conservatism and liberalism. Oxford
professor of politics and ideology Michael Freeden classifies both
terms as competing political ideologies with the same morphology
(or form), which includes recurring ideas, competition for market
share, and approaches for interpreting social arrangements.5
Though they may share a common form, the substantive content of
these two ideologies differs (as Freeden goes on to observe).
Recognizing that different visions of "the good" exist, liberalism
promotes individual choice within some minimal constraints or, as it
is sometimes said, it puts conceptions of the right before conceptions
of the good. Freeden avoids falling into the common trap of denying
that liberalism has substance, positing a thicker view of the liberal
register of commitments:
that human beings are rational; an insistence on liberty of
4. See, e.g., DAMON LINKER, THE THEOCONS: SECULAR AMERICA UNDER
SEIGE (2006); KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY: THE PERIL AND POLITICS OF
RADICAL RELIGION, OIL, AND BORROWED MONEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, at vii-xv
(2006); see also JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How
CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL
AGENDA (1996).
5. MICHAEL FREEDEN, IDEOLOGY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 78-79
(2003). Freeden identifies four political ideologies: liberalism, socialism,
conservatism, and the totalitarian ideologies. Id.
620 [Vol. 44
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thought and, within some limits, of action; a belief in human
and social progress; the assumption that the individual is the
prime social unit and a unique choice maker; the postulation of
sociability and human benevolence as normal; an appeal to the
general interest rather than to particular loyalties; and
reservations about power unless it is constrained and made
accountable.6
Each of these italicized concepts is defined not in terms of its
plain meaning but in the context of a particular social history
(although when the New Right uses these words they are stripped of
their parentage, as noted earlier by Fish). For example, the liberal
concept of "diversity" involves remedial progress to counter a history
of majoritarian domination. No part of this definition excludes
religion, since it could be encompassed by "liberty of thought."
However, religion enjoys no transcendent priority in this scheme;
quite the contrary, the exercise of religion must conform to the
enumerated values.
It is harder for Freeden to distill conservatism, but not because,
as conservatives coyly claim, it is not ideological. Indeed, hiding its
ideological tracks goes to the heart of conservative ideology
because-as explained below-ideology would be too human.7
Emphasizing its procedural rather than its substantive nature,
Freeden defines conservatism as an attitude of persistent resistance
to change, which involves:
an anxiety about change and the urge to distinguish between
unnatural and natural change.... Another common thread is
the conviction that the social order is founded on laws that are
insulated from human control; it is therefore impervious to
human will, a will that can only tamper with it harmfully.
Over time . . .different extra-human origins of a permanent
social order have been invoked: God, nature, history [for
example, original intent in constitutional jurisprudence],
biology, and economics are some of the more common anchors
to which conservatives resort.8
Although conservatism is a "largely reactive" ideology, it springs
into defensive action:
whenever it is challenged by a project that it regards both as
humanly contrived and breaking with acceptable, organic
change. [A liberal assertion of equality] is then matched by
natural hierarchy; a developmental individuality by the
sobriety of existing cultural norms; a regulatory state by a
6. Id. at 81.
7. "Despite its frequent disclaimers that it isn't an ideology,
[conservatism] too is a particular view of the political world and inevitably
contains a series of concepts structured in a specific relationship." Id. at 87.
8. Id. at 88.
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retreat into civil associations. Revolution is criminalized,
utopianism [on this earth] ridiculed. 9
Obviously the content of the two differs, but Freeden's point is
that both liberalism and conservativism are examples of the same
thing: an ideology.'° Stipulating to this, my focus is on the culture
war over their content. Communist Party organizer and
intellectual Antonio Gramsci distinguished between two phases of a
culture war that correlate to distinct phases of an actual war-the
war of position and the war of maneuver. 2 In the war of position,
combatants fight to capture a physical position on a battlefield (for
example, by using trench warfare to advance progressively further
into enemy territory).18 Once combatants secure a physical position,
the war of maneuver begins. 4 Maneuver extends dominion beyond
captured battle zones into civilian areas, eventually culminating in
an occupation under which residents of the occupied territories
finally give up. The combatants win the war of maneuver insofar as
they bring an entire physical territory under their control.
To go from an actual war to a culture war, substitute "legal
institutions" for "trenches" in the war of position. In other words,
the insurgents in a culture war must first try to capture the
institutions that formally control state power. 5 After obtaining
recognition from the legislature or becoming ensconced in think-
tanks or foundations, the insurgents begin the war of maneuver by
trying to legitimate their formal control of institutions by producing
ideology that complements and justifies their formal control. To
9. Id. at 89.
10. Freeden's definition helps to formalize liberalism as an ideology by
focusing on formal elements rather than content:
A political ideology is a set of ideas, opinions, beliefs, and values that
(1) exhibit a recurring pattern; (2) are held by significant groups; (3)
compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy; (4) do
so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and
political arrangements and processes of a political community.
Id. at 32.
11. Justice Antonin Scalia uses the phrase aptly in his apoplectic dissent in
one of the handful of Supreme Court cases finding any constitutional protection
for sexual minorities from overweaning heterosexual majorities. See Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court has
mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite .... I think it no business of the
courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war.")
(emphasis added). Patrick Buchanan popularized the culture-war metaphor
when addressing the Republican National Convention in his bid for the 1992
presidency. See Patrick J. Buchanan, Address to the Republican National
Convention (Aug. 17, 1992) (transcript available at http://www.buchanan.org
/blog/1992-republican-national-convention-speech-148).
12. See A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT 195 (Tom Bottomore ed., 1983).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. A good example of the war of position is the New Right's success in
seeding the federal judiciary with travelers from the Federalist Society.
622 [Vol. 44
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borrow Freeden's words, this involves using a "counter-set of
conceptual configurations, directed against whatever is seen by
conservatives as most threatening to the social order." 6 Winning
the war of maneuver means persuading one's opponents that one's
influence over them is legitimate (what Gramsci called
"hegemony"'7).
The war of maneuver has recently played out between liberals
and conservatives-this story line should be familiar to anyone who
has been observing trends in U.S. political culture. As early as
1986, journalist and political commentator Sidney Blumenthal
chronicled how the Right got the upper hand in The Rise of the
Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political
Power. 8  Blumenthal found the origin of the backlash against
secularization in the Remnant, a pocket of resistance to the New
Deal that would become the American Enterprise Institute.' 9 As did
others, he emphasized the importance to this process of the year
1968, in which the election of Richard Nixon marked the beginning
of a succession of Republican presidencies that reached its
apotheosis with the Reagan Administration.0 Writing in and about
1968, Republican political analyst Kevin Phillips presciently drew
attention to the Sunbelt conservatives who would later feed into the
"Religious Right."2'
To see how religionists-especially fundamentalists-have
helped this movement to quicken, we need a secular model;
otherwise we see the New Right only through its own eyes (which is,
of course, the goal of its maneuver). My proffered model draws on
Gabriel Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan's Strong
Religion, a volume from the University of Chicago's research series
on religious fundamentalisms.22 Almond and his coauthors define
religious-fundamentalist movements as being made up of:
16. FREEDEN, supra note 5, at 89.
17. See A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT, supra note 12, at 201-02.
18. SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE RISE OF THE COUNTER-ESTABLISHMENT: FROM
CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY TO POLITICAL POWER (1986).
19. Id. at 32.
20. Id. at 58-61.
21. See KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY 436-43
(1969).
22. GABRIEL A. ALMOND ET AL., STRONG RELIGION: THE RISE OF
FUNDAMENTALISMS AROUND THE WORLD (2003). This work is part of a larger
undertaking funded by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences that
produced several volumes published by the University of Chicago as part of the
Fundamentalism Project. Edited by Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, these
volumes were published in 1991 and include Fundamentalisms Observed (Vol.
1), Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and
Education (Vol. 2), Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics,
Economics, and Militance (Vol. 3), Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The
Dynamic Character of Movements (Vol. 4), and Fundamentalisms
Comprehended (Vol. 5).
2009]
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cadres composed of former religious conservatives who . . .
redefine the sacred community in terms of its disciplined
opposition to nonbelievers and "lukewarm" believers... [with]
a set of strategies for fighting back against what they
perceived to be a concerted effort by secular states [and people]
within them to push people of religious consciousness and
conscience to the margins of society. Male charismatic or
authoritarian leaders emerged from each religious tradition..
. . Acting strategically, these new fundamentalist leaders
ransacked [their] tradition's past, retrieving and restoring
politically useful doctrines and practices and creating others in
an effort to construct a religiopolitical 
ideology .... 23
These fundamentalisms start out in the modern world as
cultural "enclaves" separated from the temptations of secular society
by a "wall of virtue."24 What keeps the enclave together is a shared
"cosmology" that includes foundational assumptions about human
25
nature. In democratic societies like ours, fundamentalisms
conform to secular law by entering into a "dialectic" with the
modernist institutions to which they are opposed (or to put it
another way, by "making coalitions with infidels" 26 ). Nevertheless,
this dialectic may still be fraught with cultural risk for these
religious movements insofar as they must contend with liberalism's
unsettling core assumption of "human autonomy as the ultimate
end."27 Almond and his coauthors point out that "[dliversity and
plurality," in particular, "are the bMte noire of fundamentalisms."28
When members of these religious communities feel like the
culture of human autonomy has gone too far, their response to this
23. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 30-37. Inside the enclave, the movement "is presented as
shrunken and under siege, nay, even persecuted.... Anxiety as to the fate of
the tradition is interlaced with praise for the virtuous who stick with it." Id. at
35.
25. This cosmology is a "cognitive anchor" for the enclave:
For a type of rationality to survive in its social context it requires
cognitive anchors-notions about historical space and time, physical
and human nature, knowledge-in a word, a cosmology ...
Cosmology thus sustains and fashions, in a sort of feedback loop, the
culture of the enclave, its mode of behavior, authority, and
organization.
Id. at 56.
26. Id. at 218. This bargaining process changes both democratic society
and the fundamentalist movement: "In democratic regimes, when
fundamentalist movements make their bids for power by bargaining and
making coalitions with infidels, fundamentalists' beliefs attenuate and their
boundaries become relaxed and diffuse. Thus the dialectic that operates under
democratic regimes is different from that of authoritarian regimes."
Id.
27. Id. at 37. "The raw nerve of all these [modem and secular] forces-
implicitly in the United States and in Israel, openly in the Islamic world-
resides in their being human-centered." Id.
28. Id. at 225.
[Vol. 44624
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secular provocation can be described in terms of one of the four
modes classified by Almond and his coauthors as "world conqueror,"
"world renouncer," "world creator," and "world transformer."29 The
most extreme form of antagonism between the secular and the
religious-the "world conqueror"-seeks abolition of the modem
enemy, much as in a jihad.30 At the other end of fight-or-flight, the
religious group may turn away from the modern world into private
religiosity-the "world renouncer." 1  A more moderate strategy is
for the religious group to compete with secular society by offering a
charismatic alternative to the secular world-the "world creator"-
in the hope of attracting adherents (although this time, without the
use of force).32 Alternatively, the religious group may embrace the
dialectical negotiations between the religious and the secular and
try to adapt both itself and secular society with an eye to long-range
co-optation of secular society-the "world transformer."
33
This Essay focuses on this last strategy-transformation
through strategic co-optation. An early attempt to engage this
strategy on the national stage came in 1968 when Richard Nixon
appealed to a "silent majority" with a wounded sense of merit and
morality, a code that included believers. 34 Later triggers included
29. Id. at 146. See id. at 146-90 for an exposition of the four modes and
contemporary examples of each.
30. Id. at 151-68.
31. Id. at 185-87.
32. Id. at 179-85.
33. Id. at 168-79.
34. In a remarkably accurate prediction of how Republican power would
capitalize on this silent conservative majority after Nixon's victory, Republican
analyst Kevin Phillips gave a detailed regional analysis of how these
conservative interests could reverse the economic reforms initiated in the New
Deal and the social progress of the subsequent civil-rights movement:
The emerging Republican majority spoke clearly in 1968 for a
shift away from the sociological jurisprudence, moral permissiveness,
experimental residential, welfare and educational programming and
massive federal spending by which the Liberal (mostly Democratic)
Establishment sought to propagate liberal institutions and ideology
... . The dominion of this impetus is inherent in the list of
Republican-trending groups and potentially Republican [George]
Wallace electorates of 1968: Southerners, Borderers, Germans,
Scotch-Irish, Pennsylvania Dutch, Irish, Italians, Eastern Europeans
and other urban Catholics, middle-class suburbanites, Sun Belt
residents, Rocky Mountain and Pacific Interior populists.
Because the Republicans are little dependent on the Liberal
Establishment or urban Negroes ... they have the political freedom to
disregard the multitude of vested interests which have throttled
national urban policy.
PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 471-73. Missing from his 1969 analysis, however,
was an adequate consideration of how fundamentalists would intensify the
consolidation of Republican power. Phillips recently published another book
addressing just this question from the point of view of the risks that these
fundamentalist interests pose to secular pluralism. See PHILLIPS, supra note 4.
20091
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the seminal 1973 case of Roe v. Wade,35 which activated
fundamentalist Protestants and others.36 Between 1996 and 1999,
changing depictions of homosexuals in American entertainment and
films helped to mobilize the Christian Coalition's "[anti-gay] cultural
crusade."37 An example of the trigger-backlash cycle from the legal
academy is the Christian Legal Society's ("CLS") impact litigation
against law schools that prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.38 In each case, a secular trend jars the enclave,
triggering a backlash and a political program designed to bring
secular society back into line with the previous (imagined)
equilibrium.
Almond and his coauthors' definition of fundamentalisms also
extends to forms of Roman Catholicism that make no bones about
using all the means at their disposal to shore up normative
heterosexuality. 39 And their adherents enjoy considerable influence
in the official sectors of the United States4°-indeed, the Catholic
majority on the current Supreme Court must be seen in the context
of the long-standing conflict between secularism and Catholic
expansionism.41 Because of this unique history, Catholics can serve
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. ALMOND ET AL., supra note 22, at 132.
37. Id. at 127.
38. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Ariz. State Univ., No. CV 04-2572-
PHX-NVW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25576, at *42 (D. Ariz. Apr. 28, 2006)
(awarding attorneys' fees to CLS for the costs of bringing an action for a
declaratory judgment).
39. The Magisterium (the official Roman Catholic doctrine) asserts that
homosexual identity is depraved and anomalous: "In Sacred Scripture
[homosexual acts] are condemned as a serious depravity and even presented as
the sad consequence of rejecting God .... [Hiomosexual acts are intrinsically
disordered and can in no case be approved of." SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE
DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS CONCERNING
SEXUAL ETHICS § 8 (1975) (emphasis added) (restating the Magisterium's
axiomatic heteronormativity).
40. The classic analysis of the Catholic fundamentalist threat to secular
pluralism in the United States is set forth in PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN
FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949). In a chapter called "The Catholic Plan
for America," Blanshard outlines a series of imaginary amendments to the U.S.
Constitution that he called the "Christian Commonwealth Amendment," the
"Christian Education Amendment," and the "Christian Family Amendment."
Id. at 267-69. In a 1987 rejoinder to Blanshard's book, Lawrence Lader
assessed the then-present balance between Catholic and secular power in the
United States. LAWRENCE LADER, POLITICS, POWER AND THE CHURCH: THE
CATHOLIC CRISIS AND ITS CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN PLURALISM (1987).
41. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Why the Catholic Majority on the Supreme
Court May Be Unconstitutional, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 173, n.15 (2006)(identifying the five Catholics on the Roberts Court as Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas, Scalia and Kennedy). This same Catholic
majority was responsible for the Court's recent decision in Gonzalez v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2007), which serves as an example of the strategic co-optation of
secular society by the New Right. For two excellent sources on the conflict
between secular pluralism and Catholic hegemony, see BLANSHARD, supra note
626 [Vol. 44
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as proxy combatants for other fundamentalists that have had less
success in than Catholics in framing opposition to Catholic doctrine
as "discrimination.
'
4
B. How the New Right Warrants Itself
To their credit as sophists and postmodernists, New Right
intellectuals have learned how to attack liberalism by restating it to
make claims that-like mutant children come back to destroy the
parent-no longer bear the same family resemblance. This Essay
tends to focus not on the claims (although I do respond to a couple of
them) but, rather, on the warrants upon which these claims rest. A
figure of formal rhetoric, a warrant is a principle or logical
proposition that gives inert facts meaning by showing that the facts
are actually evidence of a truth claim.43 Whether or not stated
explicitly, all claims to truth rest on warrants, be they based on
experience, methods, authority, or articles of faith.4  I emphasize
this technical aspect of argument to show that these classical forms
matter not only as semantic niceties but as instruments of political
power that shape our academic culture.
Stanley Fish has pointed out that the New Right co-opted the
liberal register by stripping words and values from their historical
context so as to allow them to be redeployed as needed in an
argument.45 Challenging a warrant is the most efficient and serious
way to refute arguments built from the warrant, so I take apart the
40, and LADER, supra note 40.
42. Paul Blanshard observed the dynamic in 1949 when pointing out the
risks to critics of the Catholic Church:
Any critic of the policies of the Catholic hierarchy must steel himself
to being called "anti-Catholic," because it is part of the hierarchy's
strategy of defense to place that brand upon all its opponents; and any
critic must also reconcile himself to being called an enemy of the
Catholic people, because the hierarchy constantly identifies its clerical
ambitions with the supposed wishes of its people.
BLANSHARD, supra note 40, at 5.
43. See WAYNE C. BOOTH ET AL., THE CRAFT OF RESEARCH 165-78 (2d ed.
2003).
44. Id. at 179-81.
45. Fish explains how and why it works:
Well, first of all, by a sleight of hand. The eye is deflected away from
the whole-history, culture, habitats, society-and the parts, now
freed from any stabilizing context, can be described in any way one
likes. But why is the sleight of hand successful? Why don't more
people see through it? Because it is performed with the vocabulary of
on America's civil religion-the vocabulary of equal opportunity, color-
blindness, race neutrality, and, above all, individual rights. This was
also the vocabulary of civil rights activists, anti-McCarthyites, and
liberals in general, many of whom are now puzzled and even defensive
when they hear their own words coming out of the mouths of their
traditional opponents.
FISH, supra note 3, at 312.
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following three related warrants. The first warrant is the logical
proposition that some kind of ideological equipoise exists (or should
exist) between liberals and conservatives, and leftists have skewed
the balance. The second warrant espoused by the New Right is that
real diversity includes affirmative support for socially reactionary
views, especially the very elements once sought to be mitigated by
the original diversity movement. The third warrant is that strong
religion deserves as much consideration in public life as do secular
values, a point that rests on a false equivalency between strong
religion and secular society. As a travel advisory for the academy,
this Essay makes a simple point: stay off the New Right's semantic
terrain. Rebutting, disagreeing with, or qualifying arguments based
on these three warrants (and there are others) only creates more
traction for the warrants of the New Right. Figure out how to
contest the ground of the warrant rather than any evidentiary
concerns predicated on the truth of the warrant.
1. Hailing an Apocryphal Left
The New Right has rezoned the political imagination rightward
and God-ward by disingenuously promoting the phrase "the Left,"
when there has been little to which it could refer. (Think, for
example, about how the Supreme Court Justices are arrayed on the
ideological spectrum.)4 6  Granted, there is Noam Chomsky, the
National Lawyers Guild, and the magazine The Nation, but what
the phrase "the Left" really does, rather than point to a real leftist
movement, is serve as a symbolic counterweight to an all-too-real
Right, one so robust that it succeeds in framing the culture war by
hailing an imaginary enemy. The Right needs to find an enemy of
comparable size equidistant (on the left) to the Right's position in
order to maintain the illusion of liberal balance. As a result, the
phrase "the Left" has become a signifier without a signified; yet it is
nonetheless as rhetorically charged as is "partial birth abortion" or
"special rights for homosexuals."
When liberals call themselves "the Left" (indulging in a conceit
that their register has real political bite), they go along with the
Right's framing project, because the very use of the phrase concedes
the semantic field to the Right. A well-intentioned example of such
46. To illustrate what I mean, consider the way that the U.S. Supreme
Court is classified according to its "conservative" and "liberal" members. The
consensus seems to be that its "conservative" Justices are Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, John Roberts, and Samuel Alito, that Anthony Kennedy is a
moderate, and that the left-liberal flank is brought up by John Paul Stevens,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and David Souter. This framing
understates the radicalism of the Supreme Court's right wing and overstates
the strength of its liberal flank. Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer are
conservatives. The only real liberals are Stevens and Ginsburg. The others can
be arranged to the right-and in the case of some, the ultra-right--of
conservative.
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a concession is "The Liberal Moment," by Georgetown professor E.J.
Dionne, in the Chronicle of Higher Education ("Chronicle").47 As do
I, Dionne wants to rebalance the spectrum so that the center returns
to its old location, away from the Right. When he refers to
specialized types of conservatives and social reactionaries, it is clear
whom he has in mind: "Republican conservatives,"
"neoconservatives," and "moral conservatives"; these are separate
constituencies of the New Right that come together on certain
issues. But as Dionne talks about "the Left," the categories seem
less credible (at least to me). In the space of a few paragraphs, he
uses several different terms ("left," "liberal-left," "moderate left," "far
left," "American left," "ultra-left," and "American liberals") to mimic
in form the differentiation in fact of the New Right.48 How nice it
would be to hail movements just by naming them, but the
progressive categories in Dionne's essay lack referents in fact.
2. Redefining Diversity as Backlash Inclusion
Another of the New Right's metaclaims is that diversity actually
includes celebrating and promoting social reactionaries, religious
conservatives, and their allies. In recent years, the Chronicle has
published several articles popularizing the idea that the academic
playing field is (unfairly) tilted against social reactionaries and
conservative academics. 49 For example, Emory University professor
47. E.J. Dionne, The Liberal Moment, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.),
Sept. 7, 2007, at B6, available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v54/i02
/02b00601.htm.
48. Id.
49. See Reed Browning, How to Hire Conservative Faculty Members,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 9, 2004, at B14, available at
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v50/i31/31b01401.htm (admitting that the lack of
so-called "conservative" academics is "genuine and pressing" but objecting to
David Horowitz's Academic Bill of Rights and, instead, urging a "program of
self-reform" to promote conservatives); Evan Goldstein, The Profs They Are A-
Changin', CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), July 25, 2008, at B4, available at
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v54ti46/46b00401.htm (reviewing comments on
whether demographic changes in the professoriate will make it more
conservative as baby boomers retire); Sara Hebel, Colo. Lawmaker Asks How
Colleges Ensure Academic Freedom, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Nov.
28, 2003, at A28, available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v50/i14/14a02802.htm
(discussing the success of David Horowitz in getting the Colorado legislature to
review public universities more intensively); Jennifer Jacobson, Conservatives
in a Liberal Landscape: On Left-Leaning Campuses Around the Country,
Professors on the Right Feel Disenfranchised, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash.,
D.C.), Sept. 24, 2004, at A8, available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v51
/i05/05a00801.htm (discussing claims of "conservative" legal academics that
they are discriminated against by liberal universities, in particular at law
schools); William Pilger, In but Not of Academe: A New Assistant Professor
Finds That His Conservative Politics Mean He Will Never Quite Fit In on a
Campus, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Dec. 17, 2004, at C2, available at
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v51/i17/17c00201.htm (discussing a Republican
professor complaining about feeling left out of a progressive university
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of English Mark Bauerlein makes the general case on behalf of
"conservatives" in a Chronicle article entitled "How Academe
Shortchanges Conservative Thinking." °  He recognizes that
conservatives have increased their franchise over public life ever
since Richard Nixon sounded the battle cry.5 Ruefully, though,
Baurlien also admits that a key habitat for intellectuals has resisted
conservative reparative therapy: the research university."
What makes Bauerlein's claim a warrant (and a good one, at
that) is that it turns plain facts showing patterns of variation in the
political orientation of faculty into evidence that this variation is not
only problematic but also (moving towards paranoia) reflective of a
campaign that needs to be countered. Like flies drawn to a pitcher
plant, liberals get mired in addressing the evidentiary part of the
argument, for example, by pointing to political moderates in the
academy or by challenging how political orientation is defined. By
falling into the trap this way, liberals only encourage more research
about the professoriate's political views. Liberals also succumb by
conceding that this variation is a problem or that it needs to be
mitigated rather than just pointing out that this preponderance of
progressive open-mindedness is no more than what one might
expect to see in institutions of higher learning-the type of "natural"
outcome that real conservatives should accept. 4
Again, engaging the claim reinforces the warrant because
argumentative resistance to it creates traction. It's better to reject
community).
50. Mark Bauerlein, How Academe Shortchanges Conservative Thinking,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Dec. 15, 2006, at B6, available at
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v53/i17/17b00601.htm.
51. Bauerlein points out that:
the last few decades mark a breakthrough era for conservative
intellectuals. Their visibility has soared. Thirty years ago, the only
place to find conservatives on television was Firing Line, William F.
Buckley's urbane talk show. Today they appear on Meet the Press and
60 Minutes. Conservatives reign on talk radio, and the political-blog
universe tends to the right, too, especially to the libertarian view.
Id. To his credit, Bauerlein criticizes some of the same opportunistic framing to
which I also object. His basis is that the conservative canon has virtue that is
going unrecognized, as much by New Right operatives giving conservatism a
bad name as by liberal faculty. Id.
52. As Bauerlein notes:
The gains in public life are real. But it's a mistake to take the media
status of conservatives too far. For in another respect, little has
changed. When we assess intellectuals, we enter a rarified habitat of
books and ideas, and the prime setting for appreciating those is the
college campus [research university is more like it, actually]. There,
conservative intellectuals remain stymied. Their relationship to the
universities in which they found their calling and to the curriculum
and scholarship they studied-that remains tenuous.
Id.
53. See Goldstein, supra note 49.
54. See Browning, supra note 49.
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the ground of the warrant. For example, Bauerlein is right to say
that one function of academe is to critically examine dominant
ideas.55  The irony is that it is just this type of academic
examination-through feminism, gender, and race studies-that has
triggered the backlash against liberal hegemony, not that liberal
academics throw stones at religious colleagues in the faculty lounge.
Far from it-it is that liberal academics (maybe most academics) do
not care about the religious views of their colleagues. If you are
doing it right, the academic enterprise facilitates a healthy interest
in the new, such that devotional practices-or theory based on such
practices-may not be as interesting as other intellectual
developments in the university. We do not subsidize blacksmiths, so
it seems odd to shore up interest in practices that may be outdated.
The values of the past do live on as objects of study but not as
frameworks for academic action.
3. Making Opportunistic Parallelisms Between Religion and
Secularism
A third type of warrant builds pretextual parallels and
equivalences between religion and secular values. One version of
the equivalency warrant says that the "unchurched" reject or
discount religion-especially fundamentalist religion-because they
do not understand it. For example, sociologist of religion Peter
Berger claims that "'[ftlundamentalism' is considered a strange,
hard-to-understand phenomenon."56 Framed as a knowledge gap,
what is needed is education to bridge the divide. So Berger wants a
"middle ground" between secular consideration of religion and more
"respect" for the views of the faithful. 57 The events of September 11,
2001, have increased demand for knowledge about Islam, and non-
Islamic religionists have been free-riding on the trend.58
What could be better, when speaking to academics, than calling
for more education about anything? (Again-this is a smart move).
The call has a surface resemblance to liberalism because it invokes
liberty of thought and progress, but Berger is really trying to
confuse an academic reading of a religious text with a devotional
reading of it. The former belongs in a classroom and the latter
belongs in a church. The unvarnished truth is that proponents of
55. "American society.., is poorly served when ideas in the public sphere
don't undergo conceptual, historical, and political analysis in the classroom."
Bauerlein, supra note 50.
56. Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview,
in THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD
POLITICS 1, 2 (Peter L. Berger ed., 1999).
57. See generally id.
58. For example, the Harvard faculty recently considered and rejected
increasing the coverage of religion in its core curriculum. See Sean Alfano,
Harvard Proposes Curriculum Overhaul, CBSNEwS.cOM, Feb. 8, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/08/national/main2446504.shtml.
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more religiosity in academic life seek not to educate, but instead to
reproduce conservative thought as a practice (devotionally as it
were). Trying to frame it as an academic problem-organized
around contestability and truth-seeking-puts liberals on the
defensive, such that they start to wonder if they should feel guilty
about their reasoned disdain for devotional practices into the
classroom.
A second form of the equivalency warrant is that secularism is
just another values system that is no better than the religious
alternatives. In this case, I am willing to disregard my own advice
about speaking at and against the warrant, but not from it, because
engaging the warrant by addressing the claim helps liberalism to
own up to its own substantive values. As noted by Freeden,
liberalism is an ideology that does contain substantive values like
individual autonomy and choice, progress, and sociability.59 And
liberalism rules out certain life projects out of hand, for example,
slavery. Liberals, however, sometimes stay in the closet about their
values. This is too bad, as doing so avoids a contest on the field of
values from which liberalism could easily emerge victorious.
In particular, some attempts to make religious systems seem
equivalent to secular systems draw support from a misreading of
sociology's secularization thesis. Addressing competition between
the secular and the religious, the secularization thesis predicted
that in industrialized countries religion would decline in importance
relative to secularism.60 That has not been the case. Indeed, it has
59. See FREEDEN, supra note 5, at 81.
60. A sociologist of religion at the London School of Economics, David
Martin, wrote the first modem synthesis of the secularization thesis. See DAVID
MARTIN, A GENERAL THEORY OF SECULARIZATION 1-3 (1978). Martin prefaces his
theory by noting that these propositions describe Christian societies in
particular, because it was in Christian theocracies that secularization began:
Certain broad tendencies towards secularization in industrial society
have already been fairly well established. These are of the following
kind: that religious institutions are adversely affected to the extent
that an area is dominated by heavy industry; that they are more
adversely affected if the area concerned is homogenously proletarian
[due to the rise of labor unions]; that religious practice declines
proportionately with the size of an urban concentration; that
geographical and social mobility erodes stable religious communities
organized on a territorial basis; that it also contributes to a
relativization of perspectives through extended culture contact; that
the church becomes institutionally differentiated in response to the
differentiation of society, notably into pluriform denominations and
sects; that the church becomes partially differentiated from other
institutional spheres: such as justice, ideological legitimation, the
state apparatus, social control, education, welfare; and this is
paralleled by a compartmentalization of an individual's religious role
which may encourage a range of variation in personal religion which
contributes to institutional disintegration.
Id. at 2-3.
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often been secularizing milestones that have triggered some of the
most robust waves of countersecularization, even in industrialized
countries.6
Some religionists have seized onto the survival of religion in
industrialized society as proof of its worth. To counter the ground of
the warrant, I must point out that the secularization thesis does not
have a normative valence because it sought to explain and to
predict, not to judge. Second, survival is no virtue. It is a morally
neutral evolutionary fact. What is most beautiful or worthy may
become extinct, not because it lacked value but because it lacked
fitness."
Many fundamentalist sects seek to expand, so the family
becomes a cell of religious reproduction and expansion.13 Oxford
biologist Richard Dawkins sees human beings as "survival
machines" used by "selfish genes" to replicate and persist' What
survives is the gene itself in descendants of human survival
machines. Similarly, fundamentalist families become "survival
machines" for religious ideology. Where a gene has DNA strands
that define its content and guide replication, fundamentalist
religions encode content through faith. What survives by serial
reproduction through chains of dynastically linked families is a
religious cosmology.
65
61. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text; see also Berger, supra
note 56, at 9-10.
62. Richard Dawkins makes the related point that from any perspective
other than the gene or the individual or the species that wins the contest for
existence, survival is neither good nor bad; it is simply an adaptive trait
demonstrating a gene's success in choosing a host-or series of hosts-that have
made the gene's persistence possible: "The replicators that survived were the
ones that built survival machines for themselves to live in." RICHARD DAWKINS,
THE SELFISH GENE 19 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis omitted).
63. The best recent example of fundamentalist deployment of children this
way is depicted in the film JESUS CAMP (A&E Indiefilms 2006), which examines
a Christian Evangelical summer camp for children of parents who want to train
their children to be Christian "soldiers of Christ" against secularization,
particularly on the issue of reproductive autonomy. In the film, inspirational
speakers preach to the children and youth (the ages range from about five to
about seventeen) about the ravages of abortion using graphic images of fetuses
and abortions. Many of the young people display strong emotional reactions:
crying, shaking, and, with the encouragement of other participants, speaking in
tongues. According to the camp's organizer, the camp is modeled on the child-
rearing and indoctrination practices of fundamentalist Islam. Id.
64. Readers of Richard Dawkins's The Selfish Gene will recognize the model
of self-interested reproduction. DAWKINS, supra note 63, at v ("We are survival
machines-robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules
known as genes.").
65. The mystery, of course, is going from the original to the production of
copies. In the gene, protein production influences the timing of chemical
processes related to reproduction:
But if the DNA is really a set of plans for building a body, how are the
plans put into practice? How are they translated into the fabric of the
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The home, then, is the primary market for religious replication,
hence the strategic value of children. If you accept this, you should
be open to seeing how liberal legalism gives the reproduction of
fundamentalism a competitive advantage. Rejecting the liberal
register, fundamentalist parents seek to turn their children into
religious delegates. For the sake of formal equality, though,
liberalism treats all adults (former children) the same, regardless of
whether these adults were socialized into liberal values or family
agency in the service of the religious worldview. The conforming
fundamentalist child becomes an adult whose religious conviction
has a long (foreign-to-him) pedigree, while the liberal child becomes
an adult with a faith-or no faith at all-native to her. In any
event, the choice will spring from that person and not relate back to
a parental determination, which itself relates back to a
determination by a prior set of parents, and so on. Liberalism, then,
is a weak sister because its built-in Gresham's law lets adherents
66
opt out of the system and, worse still, work for a fifth column.
II. MULTISECTARIAN ALLIANCES BETWEEN THE ABRAHAMIC SECTS
The previous Section developed the concept of a political-
economy cycle in which secular provocation activates religious
backlash, leading to a war of ideological maneuver against the
offending secular trigger. This Section argues that one trigger in
particular-reducing discrimination against sexual minorities-
catalyzes this cycle in intense ways that are on the rise. Reducing
animus against sexual minorities often takes the form of so called
"tolerance" for sexual diversity, including homosexuality,
bisexuality, and sexual orientations other than garden-variety
heterosexuality. For many believers, this tolerance becomes an
existentially unbearable provocation from secular society. Once
triggered, backlash follows. So, sexual minorities remain uniquely
exposed when strong religion gains traction in public life, whichever
sect happens to be leading the charge at the moment.
Ordinarily, the sects disagree on foundational questions, as
noted by Almond and his coauthors when they say that the
particularism of the sects leaves them unlikely to form "menacing
international combinations."67 Indeed, the sects compete with each
body? This brings me to the second important thing DNA does. It
indirectly supervises the manufacture of a different kind of molecule-
protein.
Id. at 23. The analogy to protein in the replication of fundamentalism is the
reproduction of the parent's religious views in the mind of the child.
66. Gresham's law provides a macroeconomic explanation for why in
economies with more than one currency-a "better" one resistant to inflation
and a "softer" one prone to inflation-it is the inflationary currency that will
crowd out the better currency. See F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS AND ECONOMics 318 (1967).
67. "We note, further, the ambivalence of fundamentalisms-they want to
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other for a larger market share of souls. 8 Despite these conflicts of
interests, fundamentalist strains of Roman Catholicism,
Protestantism, Judaism, and Islam join forces to act against sexual
minorities.61 In the United Kingdom, "[a] Muslim-Christian alliance
was recently formed to oppose the repeal of [an anti-gay law, which
blocked promotion] of homosexuality in [public] schools." 0  A
multisectarian alliance was also behind what happened in
Jerusalem in 2006 when Christian, Jewish, and Muslim groups
joined forces to block a gay-rights parade:
Jerusalem's lesbian and gay community has
unintentionally succeeded in doing something that has eluded
the world's greatest thinkers: Unite [many members of] the
three major monotheistic religions.
rule the world but they are intrinsically parochial or particularistic, which
reduces the probability of menacing international combinations." ALMOND ET
AL., supra note 22, at 242.
68. The clearest place to see this competition is in the Latin American
market, in which syncretic forms of evangelical and pentacostal Protestantism
have made dramatic inroads into the Catholic Church's former monopoly,
leading a prominent London School of Economics sociologist of religion to
conclude that the Protestant Revolution has been imported to Latin America.
DAVID MARTIN, TONGUES OF FIRE: THE EXPLOSION OF PROTESTANTISM IN LATIN
AMERICA 280-82 (1990). And this has led the Catholic Church to compete more
seriously by copying the business model of the upstart Protestants. The
Catholic Church is responding tit-for-tat: "The business-like styles of promotion
and organization found among evangelicals are also being adopted by the
Catholic Church. Catholicism in Latin America is developing a committed
active membership and entering into the religious competition with all the
means of communication available to it." Id. at 281.
69. The two litmus-test issues for these groups are abortion and
homosexuality. Euthanasia and other issues might be equally important in
terms of doctrine, but in terms of practical importance and visibility, it is
abortion and homosexuality that form the territorial borders of the debate.
Although they both occupy a similar location in the ideology, the conflict over
homosexuality has a different structure. With means and the willingness, one
can obtain an abortion, thereby mitigating prohibitions on reproductive
freedom. The need to abort is episodic, being triggered only in a pregnancy, so
it may be easier for some to avoid feeling the conflict or objecting to prohibitions
on abortion until they find themselves in that position. In contrast, there is no
way to "cover-in the sense used by the Uniform Commercial Code (see U.C.C.
§ 2-712 (2002))-for a prohibition on homosexuality except for leaving a job, a
family, or a country. Also, one's sexual condition is more of a constant, in the
sense that it lasts over time, than a pregnancy, which has a definite beginning
and end. So, while it is true that abortion and homosexuality both act as
ideological markers or anchors, there is something more constitutive-in the
sense of formation and foundation-about religious fundamentalism's rejection
of homosexuality than there is about its rejection of abortion.
70. Anissa Hdlie, Holy Hatred, 12 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 120, 123
(2004).
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Orthodox Jews, conservative Muslims, and prominent
Christian leaders are united in their opposition to a gay-pride
march in Jerusalem, a city that's holy to all three religions.
The pope called for today's march to be canceled. Muslim
leaders criticized it as a disgrace. Orthodox Jews organized
weeks of violent demonstrations.71
That radically different sects could come together this way
suggests that-at their core-they share a deep structure of virulent
and constitutive homophobia. So I part ways with the conclusion
reached by Almond and his coauthors that the "parochialism" of
fundamentalists will keep them from finding common ground. 2
Indeed, they already have much in common when it comes to family
and sexual structure. Almond and his coauthors identify a cross-
cultural "fundamentalist family trait": a religious justification for
sex-based differences, including an expectation that women will
raise children.73 I suggest another fundamentalist family trait:
heterosexuality offspring preference. As I have written elsewhere,
when imagining future children, many (perhaps most) heterosexual
parents would seem to prefer a heterosexual child over any
alternative.74 It is my contention in this Essay that fundamentalists
71. Dion Nissenbaum, Gay-Pride March Canceled, SEATTLE TIMEs, Nov. 10,
2006, at A10; see also Dion Nissenbaum, Gay Pride Parade Is Now a Rally,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 10, 2006, at 20A. Security concerns about the march led to
its cancellation, pleasing some straight supremacists who would have preferred
a more complete form of conceptual liquidation. As one Israeli deputy prime
minister in the governing coalition noted: "If it was up to me, I would send the
gay community, who insisted on celebrating in Jerusalem, to Sodom and
Gomorrah." Greg Myre, Under Heavy Police Guard, Gay Rights Advocates
Rally in Jerusalem, N.Y. TimES, Nov. 11, 2006, at A23 (quoting Deputy Prime
Minister Eli Yishai of the Shas party).
72. "Furthermore, there is an inherently parochial aspect of
fundamentalism, which limits its appeal even across religious lines, to say
nothing of the resistance found among members of an informed and largely
secularized society." ALMOND ET AL., supra note 22, at 218.
73. Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Feminists in these
cultures would no doubt frame this observation differently:
Strikingly, women in these disparate settings, the anthropologists and
sociologists reported, shared a dedication to the maintenance and
valorization of patriarchal social structures. They spoke of
"feminism," or "women's liberation," but challenged and recast the
secular/Western understanding and practice, rooting their approach to
gender relations in Scriptural and traditional sources that
commanded subordination to male leadership but also sacralized
unambiguous spheres of female authority. Most saw the education
and moral formation [I would add "heterosexualization"] of children as
the most important task of the family and the mother as the central
figure in a counter-acculturative educational network that extended
beyond the home but never contravened its basic precepts.
Id. at 11-12.
74. Jos6 Gabilondo, Irrational Exuberance About Babies: The Taste for
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are even more likely than others to prefer heterosexuality in
offspring because this is the only orientation that will conform to the
worldview of the parents.75 Given the centrality of this preference to
fundamentalist families, they are correct to see a radical threat to
their social status from the antidiscrimination initiatives that
protect sexual minorities since these initiatives necessarily
denounce homophobia, even when justified in the name of God.76
For the time being, liberalism's deference to parental rights lets
parents attempt to enforce heterosexuality on their children. More
heterosexuals, though, are beginning to come to terms with their
condition, so, in time, parental coercion of orientation may become
stigmatized, a new trigger that will restart the backlash cycle.
The metaphor of fundamentalist enclaves taking refuge behind
a "wall of virtue" does not mean that the political power of these
sects is self-contained. The contrary becomes evident when we
appreciate the international reach of these multisectarian alliances.
Alliances between the Vatican and Islamic states, in particular,
have had great success in furthering the conceptual liquidation of
sexual minorities. Consider the report of Asma Jahagir, Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions,
which stated that "[official] security forces should not carry out
summary executions, drownings, and killings against persons
because of their sexual orientation, and the governments should be
held accountable."77 This finding met with opposition, particularly
from the representatives of Egypt and Iran.7 " These countries and
Heterosexuality and Its Conspicuous Reproduction, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1,
3-4 (2008).
75. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
76. Consider this admission against interest by a CLS official that anti-gay
animus may come to be viewed as seriously as racism is: "'Think how
marginalized racists are,' said [Christian activist Gregory] Baylor, who directs
the Christian Legal Society's Center for Law and Religious Freedom. 'If we
don't address this now, it will only get worse.'" Stephanie Simon, Christians
Sue for Right Not to Tolerate Policies: Many Codes Intended to Protect Gays
from Harassment Are Illegal, Conservatives Argue, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at
A6.
77. Press Release, Fifty-Seventh General Assembly, Special Rapporteurs on
Religion, Extrajudicial Killings, Torture Urge Third Committee Delegates to
Build Culture of Democracy: Need to Forge Dialogue Also Stressed to Eradicate
Intolerance, Impunity, U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3714 (May 11, 2002).
78. Correctly, the representatives of these religious interests attack efforts
to reduce discrimination against sexual minorities by challenging the concepts
that are the building blocks of tolerance in this field:
When the floor was opened for dialogue ....
[m]uch of the dialogue centered on the difference of views that
emerged during the presentation of Ms. Jahagir's report. Several
delegations said the report had been very hard to accept, since the
information presented went far beyond Ms. Jahagir's mandate....
They were also concerned that the report highlighted two concepts-
"sexual minorities" and "sex orientation"-which they felt had not
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others suggested that Jahagir had exceeded her mandate by even
considering the execution of sexual minorities-a practice which
Iran did not deny existed-within her study.79
Many of these alliances revolve around the Catholic Church
because, as the most institutionally developed of the sects, it has a
formal mechanism to promote multisectarian exchange, the
Pontifical Council of Interreligious Dialogue.8 ° A recent example of
such an alliance was that between the Vatican and Islamic states at
the U.N.'s 1994 Cairo Conference on Population, which succeeded in
curbing reproductive autonomy, stemming recognition of the rights
of sexual-minority youth, and making sure that the U.N. mandate
was not extended to include the interests of sexual minorities
generally.8 More recently, the Vatican joined forces with Islamic
states to block a proposal to extend limited domestic-partnership
benefits to U.N. staff, although it would only have provided benefits
parity to civil servants from the nine U.N. member countries that
extend those benefits to their domestic civil servants.
These types of alliances are promoted on many fronts. The
prominent Catholic theoconservative journal First Things published
a statement of affinity between prominent Evangelicals and
Catholics in 1994.8 Affirming a shared Christian zeal across
been elaborated or explained by any intergovernmental body.
Id.
79. Id.
80. Headed by Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran, the Pontifical Council has been
the hub of the Vatican's efforts in these areas. See Cardinal Jean-Louis
Tauran, Interreligious Dialogue-a Risk or an Opportunity? (May 27, 2008)
(transcript available at http://rcdhn.org.uk/interfaith/word/cardl.pdf).
81. As H6lie observes:
Not just a local or national phenomenon, fundamentalism has taken
on a global dimension. Extremist religious leaders from various faiths
are coming together to oppose sexual rights. By "closing ranks,"
coalitions of Christians, Muslims, and other fundamentalists affect
the international agenda. . . . Such alliances also blocked the
recognition of the rights of lesbians at both the 1995 World Conference
on Women held in Beijing and the review of the Beijing Platform for
Action in June 2000.
Hlie, supra note 70, at 123. See generally STANLEY JOHNSON, THE POLITICS OF
POPULATION: CAIRO 1994, at 72-87, 106-07, 113-14 (1995) (tracing the
reproductivist objections of the Vatican and Islamic countries).
82. Julian Coman, Vatican Joins Muslims to Fight Homosexual
Partnerships Islamic Delegates Have Been Outraged by UN Plans to Give Gay
Couples Equal Treatment on Pensions and Travel Expenses, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), Mar. 21, 2004, at 31. On behalf of the fifty-six-member Organization
of the Islamic Conference, the Iranian U.N. delegate promised to challenge any
benefits parity in the World Court. Id.
83. Evangelicals and Catholics Together: The Christian Mission in the
Third Millenium, 43 FIRST THINGS: MONTHLY J. RELIGION & PUB. LIFE 15-22
(1994). Signers included Harvard Law School professor and Vatican counsel
Mary Ann Glendon and then Regent University president Pat Robertson. Id. at
22.
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denominational differences, the document identifies areas of
common concern.8 In a section captioned 'We Contend Together,"
the document lays out the specific areas of convergence: advocacy
against abortion and euthanasia, support of heterosexual parental
rights, and "mutual respect between the sexes." 5  Instead of
referring to sexual minorities by name, the document uses the
language of the Magisterium to identify homosexuals and other
sexual minorities: "We reject the claim that, in any or all of these
areas, "tolerance" requires the promotion of moral equivalence
between the normative and the deviant."86  The Catholic-Muslim
alliance was formalized in response to the perception that Pope
Benedict had made untoward remarks about Islam. The first volley
was an open letter signed by 138 prominent Muslim clerics-A
Common Word Between Us and You-pitching cooperation between
Muslims and Christians on several grounds, including a shared
87interest in peace.
CONCLUSION
Violent hatred in the name of God is probably the worst thing
that can happen when strong religion is set loose in the public
square, but there is a slippery slope towards this calamity. For most
of us, it starts as part of a battle of ideas between traditional liberal
restraints on the role of strong religion and stealth campaigns to
insinuate religious values and practices into secular life. What is a
good liberal to do?
First, recover the moral high ground by owning up to the
superiority of liberal values as substantive values that can and
should compete with those who try to pass themselves off as "values
coalitions." Second, learn to spot opportunistic parodies of liberal
values. Not all calls for diversity and pluralism are the real thing.
This requires skills in rhetoric, the right (rather than the Right's)
model of how strong religion works, and the guts needed to break
from the herd. Third, reframe the parodies of liberal values-
assertively and with humor-rather than entering into the thicket
84. The document emphasizes convergence between the denominations:
"We thank God for the discovery of one another in contending for a common
cause.... Our cooperation as citizens [in secular society] is animated by our
convergence as Christians." Id. at 18.
85. Id. at 18-19.
86. Id. at 19.
87. Of course, it is a compelling interest: "Christians and Muslims
reportedly make up over a third and over a fifth of humanity respectively....
making the relationship between these two religious communities the most
important factor in contributing to meaningful peace around the world." An
Open Letter and Call from Muslim Religious Leaders to: His Holiness
Pope Benedict XVI et al. 15 (Oct. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/multimedia/archive/00218/Open-letter fromM
218459a.pdf.
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of contestable claims generated by the New Right's warrants.
Finally, if you are a liberal and a leader but you lack the intestinal
fortitude to use your position to stand up for the rights of sexual
minorities, consider stepping aside in favor of someone who will.
